.
Perhaps the simplest DSM technique is conservation through efficiency improvements (in lighting, motors, etc.). Other examples of DSM include direct load control and cycling of certain loads.
Other DSM techniques may be described as price-based schemes, because they provide the consumer with mone tary incentives to help reduce system peaks. The simplest scheme, at least conceptually, is spot pricing: through the operation of a "spot" market, price would instantaneously adjust until the market "clears" (i.e. demand equals sup ply) [2] . Under [3] . The use of priority service contracts, in which the consumer selects the probability of service interruption according to the need for reliable power (and pays accordingly), has also been proposed [4] . that of the forward. The resulting payoff can be seen in Figure 3 . Mathematically, we have jT(k) = fT-cT(k) = pr-max{0,pr -*} = min{pr,*}, (3) where jt(k) denotes the price of a callable forward with strike price k at time t.
We have discussed the time T payoff of a callable forward contract. We now examine the price of such a contract when it is purchased at some time t < T.
First, define the conditional distribution of the terminal spot price by
Qt(k) = Prob{pr < k\Ht], (4) where Ht denotes all that is known at time t, and define the associated density qt(k) =^Qt(k)t which we assume exists.
We assume that consumers price a particular contract at time t as the expected value of the terminal (time 7) payoff of the contract, conditional on what is known at time t. So the price of a forward contract is /t =E[pr|«t]
= / pgt(p)dp.
Jo
Similarly, for the callable forward contract we obtain (5) 
jt(*) = E[ir(*)|«t]
Jo van{ptk}qt{p)dp. (6) 
Just as knowledge of the conditional density $(&) allows calculation of the price of a callable forward contract jt(k), knowledge of contract prices can be used to infer the den sity qt(k). To see this, we first integrate (6) by parts to yield the expression i.(*)
Jo Qt(p)]dp.
Differentiation of (7) yields 3j*(*) =i-Q.(fc), (8) and, differentiating again,
Additional properties of jt(k) which follow from its def inition and the discussion above are:
• jt(k) is nondecreasing and concave in k.
• it(*) < *, VJb.
• limfc^oojt(fc) = /«. 
A necessary condition for an interior solution to this max imization is that
Recalling from (8) 
Using the assumption that qt(k) > 0, VJb > 0, we obtain
Further, since
Finally, if the consumer chooses k = v, the resulting utility will be 
We can now compute jt(k) from (23) by integrating once to obtain Qt(k), then integrating 1-Q»(fc) to obtain jt(k).
where k is the strike price of the new contract purchased at time t. A major drawback of the centralized implementation is that consumers may themselves have information concern ing the future spot price. While some of this information may come from the price-setter's Qt(k), the individual may possess some information which the price-setter does not.
In this case, the consumer's Qt(k) will be different from that of the price-setter; consequently the consumer's Qt(k) will not be consistent with the price curve jt(k) set by the price-setter, in the sense that (8) is in contrast to interruptible-load contracts which are, in theory, specified in terms of the probability of receiv ing service, such as priority service contracts [4] or the interruptible-load contracts described in [7] . Since which is equivalent to our strike price k, to illustrate the allo cation achieved under priority pricing, but the menu of priority service contracts is specified as contract price as a function of service probability. The concept of "priority insurance" is much closer to the callable forwards described here [4, 8] .
which is known to yield a socially optimal allocation. In spite of the fact that there is a risk of power interruption, these consumers suffer no financial risk as a result of their contract purchase (since they choose k = t>); they choose k = v even if they are risk-averse. Self 
so that Jf c = v is the unique maximizer of (25) , showing that risk averse consumers will also self-select the desired contract.
Appendix B: Demand Uncertainty
We now assume that v is a random variable, which is not necessarily independent of pr-Assume that pr and v have a joint density given by qt{p, v). We again ask the question of which contract the consumer will select.
As in section 4, we can write the consumer's benefit as 
When the consumer's valuation is correlated with the spot price pr, the consumer may "hedge" when selecting a contract. As an example of this, suppose that the con sumer's valuation is given by v = vo + for + €,
where t»o is a constant, and c is a zero-mean random vari able independent of pr-Since the RHS of (32) is condi tioned on the fact that pr~k, the self-selection condition becomes k = vo + 0k,
or, if0< 1,
1-r Thus, when /? € (0,1), so that the consumer's valuation is positively correlated with pr, we see that the consumer hedges by purchasing a contract with a higher strike price (higher probability of service) than would be purchased in the case of v and pr independent. Similarly, if 0 < 0, so that there is a negative correlation, then the consumer would hedge lower, purchasing a contract with a lower k than would otherwise be purchased.
